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# THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

## Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992. In those paragraphs, the Security Council:

> "Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;
>
> Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command".

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the action taken up to 18 December 1992 to implement resolution 794 (1992). I had intended to include in that section a report on the military operations of the unified command (now referred to as the "Unified Task Force"). However, on 17 December 1992, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America sent a letter to the President of the Security Council containing a report "on the activities of the Unified Task Force directed towards the implementation of that resolution." The letter has been circulated as document S/24976.

3. Section II sets out my current thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force to continued peace-keeping operations.

4. My observations are contained in section III.

## I. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

5. The specific mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concerned:

(a) The operations of UNOSOM (para. 6);

(b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);

(c) Establishment of a fund for contributions (para. 11);

(d) Establishment of mechanisms for coordination (para. 13), including the attachment of a UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of the Unified Task Force (para. 15);

(e) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

### A. The operations of the United Nations Operation in Somalia

6. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 564 all ranks, composed mainly of a 500-strong battalion, 50 military observers, movement-and-logistics elements and a small headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, on 18 December 1992, on the advice of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, I authorized the deployment of about 100 additional personnel to strengthen UNOSOM's headquarters.

7. The main activities currently carried out by the UNOSOM military component are as follows:

(a) UNOSOM has deployed two companies of its infantry battalion to Mogadishu international airport, where they are working with the Unified Task Force to maintain security;

(b) Movement control is provided for United Nations flights at the airport;

(c) Escorts are provided for all UNOSOM personnel;

(d) A liaison team has been deployed to Unified Task Force headquarters, in accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 794 (1992);

(e) Food convoys are escorted within the city of Mogadishu.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

8. As stated above, a report by the United States authorities has been circulated in document S/24976.

9. With the deployment of the Unified Task Force, the United Nations and other relief organizations are expected to implement fully their humanitarian programmes. They will also extend humanitarian assistance to areas which hitherto have been inaccessible due to security constraints. In that context, UNOSOM will enhance its capacity to discharge fully its coordination responsibilities as well as to take the lead in extending relief assistance to all parts of Somalia.

C. Establishment of a fund for contributions

10. The fund requested by the Security Council in paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) has been established by the Secretariat and is to be known as the "Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command". An initial target figure has been set at $400 million. A general appeal for voluntary contributions has been issued to all Member States by the Controller. I am coordinating my fund-raising efforts with the Governments of Japan and the United States, which are working in partnership to ensure that we attain our goal. This active fund-raising campaign will include special appeals to heads of State and Government of selected countries. As of 18 December 1992, pledges to the Fund have been made as follows:

| | $ |
|---|---|
| Finland | 700 000 |
| Japan | 100 000 000 |
| Philippines | 5 000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 10 000 000 |
| Total | 110 705 000 |

Saudi Arabia is also contributing troops to the Unified Task Force. I shall keep the Security Council informed on further developments.

D. Mechanisms for coordination

11. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

(i) A policy group on Somalia, chaired by the Secretary-General. This group currently meets twice or three times a week and at least once a week with senior representatives of the United States Government to review the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM and the transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

(ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned. This group meets at least once a day and representatives of the United States attend its meetings several times a week;

(iii) A cell in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations which maintains contact with UNOSOM 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

(b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu:

(i) My Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Force Commander, General Shaheen, are working closely with the Commander of the Unified Task Force, General Johnson, and with the United States Special Envoy, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two forces. Much of the detailed planning of the eventual transition to peace-keeping operations will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose;

(ii) A small UNOSOM liaison staff has been attached to Unified Task Force headquarters, as already described above, and has secure communications with United Nations Headquarters.

12. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have asked to participate in discussions with myself and my staff about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. I am therefore initiating regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force will be invited.

## E. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

13. Since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), I have continued my efforts to achieve a political settlement, believing it essential that such efforts should proceed in parallel with the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia. Progress on the political front is a necessary condition for the United Nations to be able to assist Somalia in launching the economic and social programmes for rehabilitation and reconstruction which will be needed to support post-conflict peace-building. In a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush, I described my vision of a division of labour between the United Nations and the United States in the following terms:

> "The United States has undertaken to take the lead in creating the secure environment which is an inescapable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, objectives which have from the outset been included in the various Security Council resolutions on Somalia."

14. As soon as resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I communicated its text to the Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of Arab States. These regional organizations have been associated, with the United Nations, in efforts to promote national reconciliation in Somalia. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, was requested to inform political parties and movements in Somalia of the implications of the adoption of the resolution. He has remained in close contact with the parties and movements.

15. The results of the technical meeting between the United Nations and various Somali groups at Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992 were encouraging. Taking this into account, as well as advice from my Special Representative and appeals from the Somali parties, I have decided to initiate the process of national reconciliation during the first phase of action by the Unified Task Force. Accordingly, I am convening an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity on Somalia, to be held at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

16. The objective of this informal meeting is to prepare a framework that will enable the Somali people themselves to develop ideas and suggest arrangements for the formation of a government in accordance with their own traditions and values. Looking ahead to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, the meeting will seek consensus on the date, venue and list of participants for such a formal conference. If possible, the meeting will prepare a draft agenda for the conference.

17. In the meantime, and only for this informal meeting, the Special Representative, as a result of his consultations with Somalis at the local level, has proposed a list of 12 Somali political movements to be invited to the informal meeting on 4 January 1993. The 12 movements are:

(1) Somali Salvation Democratic front (SSDF)

(2) Somali National Movement (SNM)

(3) Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

(4) United Somali Congress (USC) - Ali Mahdi

(5) Somali National Front (SNF)

(6) United Somali Party (USP)

(7) Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)

(8) United Somali Front (USF)

(9) Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

(10) Somali Agricultural Muki Organization (SAMO)

(11) Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)

(12) United Somali Congress (USC) - Aidid

18. I have extended invitations to the informal meeting to these 12 Somali political movements, as well as to the Secretaries-General of OAU, OIC and the League of Arab States and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn. It is also my intention to invite the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to be represented. I plan to visit the countries of the Horn, tentatively including Somalia, during the first part of January of 1993 to give further impetus to the process of national reconciliation.

## II. THE FUTURE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA AND THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSITION TO CONTINUED PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

19. Paragraph 1 of resolution 794 (1992) encapsulates the mandate which the Security Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General since it adopted resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992. This mandate has been to help the parties to establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement. In resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu. In resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. It was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in paragraph 5 of resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice, fulfilment of that condition proved to be impossible. The agreement

of "the parties" could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed; when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in that city.

20. My new Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, took up his duties in Mogadishu on 8 November 1992. His initial reports, which I summarized in my letter of 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24859), described graphically the obstacles which UNOSOM was facing. I accordingly suggested in that letter that the time might have come when it was necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia. The following afternoon I was informed that if the Security Council were to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate. The Council responded promptly and positively to these initiatives and adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In the same resolution the Council stated the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable it to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

21. The present position is thus that the Security Council, having accepted my advice that the traditional peace-keeping model was not suitable to the Somali situation, and acting under Chapter VII, has entrusted to certain Member States, on a temporary basis, the responsibility of creating a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is the wish of the Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations should be achieved promptly. It is therefore of great importance that the conditions for such a transition should be achieved as soon as possible.

22. Since resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I and senior members of my staff have had a number of meetings with representatives of the United States Government to discuss, inter alia, how and when the transition to continued peace-keeping operations could be made. In these discussions I have laid emphasis on two conditions in particular, whose importance I also stressed in a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush.

23. The first condition is that the Unified Task Force should take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws. In my letter to President Bush I referred to this need, and continued:

> "As I stated in my letter of 29 November to the President of the Security Council, any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed. Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution or to create conditions in which the United Nations existing efforts to promote national reconciliation can be carried forward and the task of protecting humanitarian activities can safely be transferred to a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation."

24. The fulfilment of this condition demands action on two fronts. First, it is necessary to establish or consolidate agreements with the leaders of all the organized factions for effective cease-fires in the various conflicts between them. These agreements must include provisions for the concentration of all the heavy weapons of each faction at designated locations where they can be brought under international control, exercised initially by the Unified Task Force and thereafter by UNOSOM. I am glad to be able to report that the leaders of the two principal factions in Mogadishu have recently agreed to a new cease-fire and to the concentration of their weapons. It is important that this agreement be quickly implemented and become the model for similar agreements elsewhere in Somalia.

25. Secondly, it is necessary to disarm the lawless gangs who have been the principal threat to humanitarian operations. In their armament and mode of operation (as described in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24868)) they are little different from the forces of the organized factions and, indeed, sometimes cooperate with them. Once the heavy weapons of the organized factions have been concentrated, all other heavy weapons should in my view be confiscated and destroyed during the Unified Task Force's stay in the country.

26. Unless effective action is taken on these two fronts, the international community's efforts to help the people of Somalia will continue to be at risk from civil war and the predation of heavily armed and lawless gangs. The necessary secure environment for humanitarian operations and the promotion of a political settlement, in accordance with resolution 794 (1992), would not be established. In such circumstances I would not be in a position to recommend to the Council that it decide to make the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

27. There remains the question of small arms held by individuals. Somalia has for long been a society in which it is normal for individuals to bear arms. However, the number of weapons held, and their calibres, have increased greatly in recent years, as a result of the vast influx of arms into the country during the cold war and developments in neighbouring countries, to the extent that they have become a standing threat to the maintenance of law and order. It will be for a new Somali Government to determine laws and regulations on the bearing of arms by individuals, and those laws and

regulations will be enforced by a new police force. Meanwhile, I believe it important that the Unified Task Force and thereafter UNOSOM should do all they can to induce individuals to hand in their weapons in order to foster a more secure environment.

28. It is also important that the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM should begin the task of clearing mines and other munitions, especially where these prevent the use of roads, bridges and other facilities required for the efficient distribution of humanitarian supplies. This is a particular problem in the north.

29. The second, and equally essential, condition is that the authority entrusted to the Unified Task Force should be exercised throughout Somalia. Paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992) imposes no geographical limitation, other than "in Somalia", on the mandate it confers and there are many other passages in the resolution (especially its paragraph 1) which show that "in Somalia" should be interpreted to mean the whole of the country. I raised this point too in my letter of 8 December to President Bush, in which I wrote:

> "I believe it essential that the purpose of the new operation should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia and that this should be apparent from the outset. It is true that the quantity of suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere, especially in the north. I was therefore heartened to hear that the unified command is studying how the new operation could be extended to all parts of Somalia."

In addition to the humanitarian argument for country-wide deployment of the Unified Task Force, there is also a compelling security argument. The objectives of the Unified Task Force would not have been achieved, nor the conditions created for the transition to peace-keeping operations, if heavy weapons and lawless gangs simply withdrew from parts of Somalia controlled by the Unified Task Force to continue their action in other parts while waiting to return and resume their harassment and exploitation of the international relief effort after the Unified Task Force had handed over control to a less numerous and powerful United Nations force.

30. A third, if somewhat longer-term, factor is the need to create a new, professional police force. I am studying how this might be done, both politically and technically. It is clear that considerable financial, material and technical help will be required from the international community to establish a neutral police force. There have already been some helpful offers from Member States in this regard and I am pursuing them.

31. My discussions with the United States authorities have also touched on the revised mandate which the Security Council might entrust to a new UNOSOM. The mission's military mandate has to date been to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to provide security for United Nations humanitarian activities there and elsewhere in Somalia (para. 22 of my report of 21 April 1992

(S/23829) and paras. 23-26 of my report of 24 August 1992 (S/24480), which were approved by resolutions 751 (1992) and 775 (1992) respectively). It is clear that this mandate will have to be enlarged in conceptual and other terms when UNOSOM takes over from the Unified Task Force.

32. My current view is that the mandate would need to continue to cover the whole territory of Somalia and to include the following tasks, which are based on the assumption that during its presence in Somalia the Unified Task Force will have brought about an effective cessation of hostilities throughout the country and will have established the secure environment called for in resolution 794 (1992):

(a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other military arrangements to which they will have agreed during the Unified Task Force's presence in the country;

(b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against a faction which violates, or threatens to violate, the cessation of hostilities;

(c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control by the Unified Task Force, pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;

(d) To maintain security at all ports and airports required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To protect, as required, warehouses, distribution centres and convoys of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;

(f) To continue a programme for de-mining in the most afflicted areas;

(g) To provide, as requested, advice on, and technical assistance to, the formation of a police force and a new national army;

(h) To carry out such other functions as may subsequently be authorized by the Security Council.

33. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would, to an important extent, depend upon the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia before it withdrew, and cannot therefore be estimated at this early stage of its operations. My recommendation to the Council is likely to be that the initial deployment should be rather substantial, in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security established by the Unified Task Force, but that it should be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new national army and police force become operational.

34. I and my colleagues have agreed with our United States interlocutors that there must be a smooth transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs to compromise the secure environment created by the Unified Task Force. UNOSOM will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over instantly from the Unified Task Force in each area from which it withdraws. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area; it could not be implemented throughout the country on a single day.

35. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have expressed to the United States authorities and/or to me a willingness for their contingents to serve eventually in UNOSOM. I welcome these offers and will present recommendations to the Security Council on the national composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as it is possible to determine its resource requirements. In formulating such recommendations I shall take into account the established criteria which the Security Council has endorsed in the past, including the necessary regional and political balance, military capacity and previous peace-keeping experience. Subject to these criteria, it will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which will already be in Somalia serving under the command of the Unified Task Force. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of the Unified Task Force to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph.

36. Any resources required by the new UNOSOM which cannot, for one reason or another, be made available from units already serving with the Unified Task Force will need to be deployed to Somalia in good time for the planned transition. In this context I am particularly concerned about the logistic units which will be required. It is my understanding that the bulk of the logistic support for the Unified Task Force will be provided by the United States. Logistic units are always the most difficult to find when a new peace-keeping operation is being put together. I have therefore indicated to the United States authorities that they are likely to be asked to keep some logistic units in Somalia in support of UNOSOM for some time after the main body of their troops has been withdrawn.

37. My and my colleagues' discussions with the United States authorities have been useful in clarifying many points and establishing much common ground about the modalities for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. However, they have brought to light certain differences of approach as regards the timing of detailed planning for the transition. The United States representatives have pressed for such planning to begin now. I and my representatives, on the other hand, have taken the line that it would be difficult to move from discussion of concepts to the formulation of concrete plans until more is known about the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment which would permit the transition to take

place. I have also had in mind the effect, positive or negative, that the evolution of the political process can have on the security environment. It is to be hoped that this factor will become easier to assess after the meeting which is to be held at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

38. At the most recent meeting with United States representatives, which took place on 18 December 1992, it also became clear that their thinking differed somewhat from the concept described in the preceding paragraphs of the present report. They envisaged the Unified Task Force being replaced by a new UNOSOM which would be under United Nations command and control but whose mandate, concept of operations, level of armament and rules of engagement would be little different from those of the Unified Task Force itself. It was argued that a force mandated and organized on normal peace-keeping lines would not be capable of protecting humanitarian activities from factional forces or gangs which would not have been neutralized or disarmed during the presence of the Unified Task Force in Somalia. The United States representatives hoped that the transition from the Unified Task Force to this new UNOSOM could begin as soon as possible. My representatives undertook to convey this new approach to me and to consider whether joint planning could proceed on this basis.

## III. OBSERVATIONS

39. In paragraph 19 of resolution 794 (1992) the Security Council asked me to "submit a plan ... to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command". Section II of the present report sets out my current ideas on the kind of mandate UNOSOM would require to maintain the secure environment for humanitarian relief operations which will have been established by the Unified Task Force. It also sets out my ideas on the conditions which will have to be fulfilled before I would feel able to recommend to the Security Council that it make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations. To that extent, the present report can be regarded as a conceptual plan for UNOSOM's new tasks after the Unified Task Force has completed the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992).

40. It will obviously be necessary to convert the conceptual plan into a specific plan detailing the troops and equipment required for UNOSOM, their deployment, arrangements for their logistic support, their rules of engagement and so on. Once these details are established it will be possible to work out quickly how the transition to continued peace-keeping operations can be put into effect. I share the United States authorities' wish that this work should be undertaken as soon as possible. But in my view the moment for it has not yet come. The Unified Task Force has been on the ground for only 10 days and it is too soon to make an evaluation of its success in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian operations and of the resources that will be required to enable UNOSOM to maintain that environment. At this stage, therefore, I am not in a position to offer the Council a specific and concrete plan for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

41. By the same token it is too soon to take a decision on the approach described in paragraph 38 above. This differs from the peace-keeping model by which I have so far been guided in accordance with resolution 794 (1992). It reflects a view that the Unified Task Force will not establish a secure environment of a kind that could be maintained by a normally mandated and armed peace-keeping force and that a considerable capacity for enforcement will therefore have to be kept in existence under United Nations command. This concept would require a further decision by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and would be analogous to the fifth option for which I expressed a preference in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council.

42. The question which will have to be addressed in due course is whether such an operation would be feasible, taking into account the considerations referred to in that letter. To answer that question it will be necessary to know much more about the extent and success of the Unified Task Force's operations. It will also be necessary to know how many Member States, those already contributing to the Unified Task Force or others, would be ready to participate in an operation of this kind and whether their number would be sufficient for the task proposed.

43. There are wider reasons, extending beyond the success of the Unified Task Force or the readiness of Member States to support a peace enforcement operation under United Nations command, which lead me to conclude that it would be premature to determine at this stage how and when the Unified Task Force should be replaced. For the United Nations that decision will have very far-reaching consequences. Resolution 794 (1992) commits it to taking on another major peace-keeping operation at a time when both the Organization's capacity to manage such operations and Member States' readiness to finance them have been stretched almost to the limit by the huge expansion in peace-keeping in 1992. The approach described in paragraph 38 above presents an even more daunting prospect, namely the first peace-enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command. Whichever of these two options the Security Council may eventually choose, the Secretary-General has to do what he can to ensure, before decisions are taken, that conditions exist which offer a reasonable prospect of the operation succeeding. One of these conditions is confidence in continuing support from Member States, upon whom that success would be critically dependent.

44. In addressing these questions, I am conscious not only of the overriding humanitarian imperative but also of the interrelationship between the political process and security. Without improved security the political process cannot prosper. But there is little prospect of a sustained improvement in security unless the political process does prosper. A number of the factors identified in the present report as being relevant to the establishment of a secure environment will be strengthened if momentum can be maintained in the political process, just as they will be weakened if momentum is lost. Examples are the establishment of cease-fires, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs, the creation of a new police force. Without for one moment suggesting that the Unified Task Force should remain in

Somalia until the peace process achieves its goals, I do believe that progress in the peace process must be taken into account in deciding how and when the Force should be replaced by a new UNOSOM. The informal meeting over which I shall preside at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993 is of special importance in this regard.

45. Another consideration underlining what may seem an over-cautious approach is the fact that the international community faces a long haul in helping the people of Somalia to put their country on its feet again. There will have to be an integrated approach towards the restoration of security, political reconciliation, the re-creation of institutions, the return of refugees, rehabilitation, reconstruction - in short, all the elements of post-conflict peace-building. Hasty decisions at the very beginning of this process could have far-reaching and nefarious consequences. It would be a tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks.

46. For all these reasons, I recommend that the Security Council defer a decision on these questions until the situation on the ground in Somalia becomes clearer.

47. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the United States of America for the leadership which it has shown in its response to the crisis in Somalia. In my letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush I wrote:

> "I wish to express my appreciation for the significant contribution which the United States, under your leadership, is making to this endeavour. I should also like to assure you of my full commitment, and that of my Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, to working as closely as possible with you to ensure that together we can succeed in relieving the appalling suffering in Somalia and putting that country on course to a peaceful and more secure future".

The frankness with which, in the present report, I have described certain differences of approach between the Secretariat and the United States is a measure of the excellent working relationship that has been established between us since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), both in New York and in Mogadishu. That close cooperation will continue. Equally, I pay tribute to the more than 20 Member States from all continents that have decided to participate in the Unified Task Force and to those that have contributed, or will contribute, to the Trust Fund which has been established to support the Force.

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